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STATUTE OF QUIA EMPTORES
What is a base, or qualified fee?
exist?
May such a fee still
It has been said by high authority that, since the
passage of the Statute of Quia Emptores, 18 Edward I-A.D.
1290, it is not possible that such a fee, or qualified es-
tate, can logically exist. In determining this question, we
must consider that, while by the common law, contrary to
the rule of the civil law, we are more or less controlled
by the doctrine of stare decisis, it cannot be held that our
law decisions must always be logical. We believe that such
a rule in many cases would create injustice and lead to the
perversion of natural equity, but before we consider this
phase of the subject, let us determine, from an examination
of the text writers and opinions of the various courts,
just what is the extent of this kind of a fee or estate and
whether it may be considered as an estate.
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We find in Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, at
page 65, this description of this particular fee:
"A base or qualified fee is such a one as has a quali-
fication subjoined thereto, and which must be determined
whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end. As
in the case of a grant to A. and his heirs, tenants of the
manor of Dale; in this instance, whenever the heirs of A.
cease to be tenants of the manor the grant is entirely de-
feated.
This estate is a fee, because by possibility it may en-
dure forever in a man and his heirs, yet as that duration
depends upon the concurrence of collateral circumstances,
which qualify and debase the purity of the donation, it is
therefore a qualified or base fee".
As to the existence of any estate created or reserved
in the grantor or donor, we find this statement in Black-
stone, Book II, page 835, "No tenant * * * * since the enact-
ment of the Statute of Quia Emptores could create a new
tenancy to hold for himself". We will find therefore, that
the fee which we are considering does not create or reserve,
in the grantor or donor, an estate but a mere possibility of
reverter.
In Kent's Commentaries,' it is said that "A qualified,
base or determinable fee is an interest which may continue
forever, but the estate is liable to be determined, without
the aid of a conveyance, by some act or event circumscrib-
ing its continuance or extent. Though the object on which
it rests for perpetuity may be transitory or perishable,
yet such estates are deemed fees, because it is said, they
have a possibility of enduring forever".
In Washburn on Real Property,2 we find this illustra-
tion, quoting in part from Blackstone, "A limitation to one
and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale, etc., or for so
14 Kent's Commentaries, 5th Ed. page 9.
2Washburn Real Property, 6th Ed. page 8.
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long as a certain tree stands, or until the marriage of a
certain person, or till a man shall go to, or return from
Rome, or till certain debts are paid, or so long as A., or his
heirs shall pay B. a certain sum per annum, or so long as
St. Paul's Church shall stand, or until a prescribed act shall
be done, or until a minor shall attain the age of twenty-one
years and the like."
In examining the American cases, it appears that this
form of an estate is quite uniformly held to exist. In an
early Pennsylvania case, we find this holding, to wit: "An
estate limited to a person and his heirs, with a qualifica-
tion annexed to it, by which it is provided that it must
determine whenever the qualification is at an end, creates
a qualified or determinable fee". Also in the same case
it is held that "the terms base fee, qualified fee, and de-
terminable fee are used interchangeably to denote a fee
which has a qualification subjoined thereto and which must
be determined whenever the qualification annexed thereto
is at an end". As to the place wherein said qualification
must be found, or exist, it is held in the same Pennsylvania
case that the qualification must be found in the instrument
itself, "presumably as being a part of the limitation of the
estate," and said case further holds that "no special or
technical words are required to establish or qualify the
limitation."
In a New Jersey case, it was held that "where a deed
was made to a grantee of land, so long as used for a
canal, that the estate continued until the qualification upon
which it is limited is at an end, and that the grantees
have the same rights and privileges over the estate as if
it were a fee simple, so long as the estate continues."'
In Massachusetts, it is held that "The estate known as
a qualified or determinable fee exists, and that a grantee
3Bryan v. Spiers, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 580.
4State v. Brown, 27 N. J. L. 13.
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holding a deed which conveyed to a corporation land for a
special purpose could not convey to a third person an
estate in fee simple absolute."
This estate is described in another American holding as
"A fee which is liable to be determined by some act or
event, expressed in its limitation to circumscribe its con-
tinuance, or inferred by law as bounding its extent." In
another Pennsylvania case, occurs this description and com-
ment, "A qualified, base or determinable fee is an interest
which may continue forever, but the estate is liable to be
determined by some act or event circumscribing its con-
tinuance or extent, as to a man and his heirs so long as A.
shall have heirs of his body, or to a man and his heirs
tenants of the manor of Dale, or till the marriage of B.,
or so long as a certain tree should stand.
In these and similar cases, the estate will descend to
the heirs, but continue no longer than the period mentioned
in the respective limitation, or when the qualifications, an-
nexed to it, are at an end. If the owner of a determinable
fee convey in fee simple, the determinable quality of the
estate follows the transfer. Nemo potest plus juris in
alienum transferre quam ipse habet." The general policy
of this country does not encourage restraint upon the
power of alienation of land. "A qualified, base or determin-
able fee is created by deed, by will or by some other in-
strument of writing in express terms, and cannot be implied
by law. The instrument which creates the estate shows
at the same time its limitations. It is part and parcel of
the title, and hence there is no injustice in 'the purchaser
taking the estate with the determinable quality annexed
to it.7
If land is conveyed to a trustee to hold the same for
a special use, or to sell and convey the same, "the designa-
First Universalist Church of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171.
6McLane v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 27.
7Union Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Wharton 427.
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tion of such use does not create a base or qualified fee";s
and it seems that in such case the trustee may sell and
convey, applying the proceeds to the same uses as those
for which the land was given.'
If, however, an estate is conveyed in fee, "for a special
purpose and no other," the fee is a base fee and determin-
able on the cessation of the use of the property for that
purpose." 10 In an Illinois case, it was held that "should
the happening of the event upon which the estate is to de-
termine become impossible it is converted into an estate
in fee simple absolute."' As to the user or right of enjoy-
ment of the one who holds land under this restricted fee or
estate we find this holding: "Under a deed conveying only
a qualified fee, the grantee has, while his estate continues,
the same right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of
the land granted and as complete dominion over it for all
purposes as though he held it in fee simple absolute,"
12
and he is not generally liable for waste,' 3 but it is to be
presumed that if the event, upon which the estate is to
determine, is quite likely to happen in the near future, the
owner of the land, subject to such a fee, would be liable
for equitable waste.'
As to the right to inherit or convey property subject
to this form of holding, we find these decisions: "A determ-
inable fee is descendable to heirs and may be assigned,
devised or conveyed,"" although the owner cannot convey a
title in fee simple absolute, and his grant only conveys a
determinable fee."' ' In an Indiana case, where by the will
aBrandle v. German Reformed Congregation, 33 Pa. St. 415.
OGriffiths v. Cope, 17 Pa. 96; Kirk v. King, 3 Pa. 436.
*loScheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. State 126.
"Keffler v. Keffler, 56 N. E. 1094.
12N. J. Zinc Co. v. Morris Canal, Etc. Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398.
18U. S. v. Torrey Cedar Co., 154 Fed. 263.
1"Vane v. Lord Barnard, 2 Vernon Chancery (Eng.) 738; Stevens
v. Rose, 69 Mich. 259.
"Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. 426.
"6First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155
Mass. 171.
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of her father a daughter is given land in fee simple,
subject only to the contingency that she shall die without
issue, or that her surviving issue shall die before arriving
at full age, the estate taken is a determinable fee. '"
As to a conveyance in the form of a lease, we find this
holding, "A lease for as long as the lessee, his heirs or
assigns, shall pay a stipulated ground rent, and shall comply
with all the covenants herein contained," was held to create
a determinable fee in land.18
Considering that the Statute of Quia Emptores was
intended to apply to estates in fee simple absolute,1 9 and
that no estate remains in the grantor or donor, but merely
a "possibility of reverter", which at common law could not
be conveyed to a third person, 0 there" would seem to be
no legal objection to the existence of this form of a fee.
In Pennsylvania, however, this possibility of reverter may
be conveyed away by the grantor or his heirs, 21 but we
see no reason why this should work against this form of a
fee, and it has always seemed to us that this Pennsylvania
right to convey a possibility of reverter to a third person
is a legal right which for purposes of utility should be held
to exist.
Furt)-ermore, a base or qualified fee furnishes a mode
of creating an estate, the use of which may be restricted to
a certain definite purpose. This is often desirable where
one wishes to devote his land to religious, charitable, educa-
tional or other like purposes. Therefore, it would seem
that as this form of a fee serves a very useful purpose it
should, taking all considerations into account, be allowed to
exist.
ROBERT W. LYMAN
17Greer v. Wilson, 108 Ind. 322.
lSAtkinson v. Orr, 83 Ga. 34-9 S. E. 787.
19Blackstone, Book II, page 136.
20Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142-150; First




Do our elections go by default because the electors
are afraid to exercise their voting privilege, and, if so,
what may be the remedy? It has been said that if our
experiment in democracy fails it will not be due to the
success of military forces commanded by some brilliant
general, but that our downfall will be brought about by
"General Apathy". Is it not true that in many of our
elections general apathy seems to "reign supreme," for it is
notorious that in many elections only a minority of the
voters take the trouble to go to the polls and vote. Would
compulsory voting cure this evil? For if it is not an evil,
we might as well give up and go back to an aristocratic
form of government. Does it not happen often that some
salutary laws, enacted for the benefit of those who are
cursed by an uncontrollable appetite, are repealed by the
efforts at election time of a minority of the voters, who
intend to cater to the damnable appetite of such unfortun-
ates, for the purpose of pecuniary gain to those who bring
about such, repeal?
That we may study the provisions of the Compulsory
Voting law, we give herewith the substance of the acts
enacted by the Commonwealth of Australia in 1918 and
1925. Also, the opinion of the High Court of the Common-
wealth construing said law and the regulations for enforc-
ing the same. The Australian Statute for Compulsory
Voting provides that "it shall be the duty of every elector
to record his vote at each election". It further makes
provision for the reporting to certain authorities the names
of those electors who have not voted at the election, and
to certify the list by a declaration under his hand, which
certification shall be prima facia evidence of the contents
thereof and of the fact that the elector named therein did
not vote at the election. The statute also provides that
notice shall be sent by mail to such persons as have failed
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to vote, calling upon them to "give a valid, truthful and
sufficient reason why they failed to vote". The reply of
the delinquent elector shall be mailed to a certain officer
within twenty-one days after the notice is received, which
reply shall state "the true reason why such elector did not
vote". If such delinquent elector is unable for any reason
to make such reply within the specified time, this may be
done by any other elector who has personal knowledge of
the facts, which statement by such other elector must be
duly witnessed and so may be treated as a compliance with
the law in this respect. The officer receiving this report
shall endorse upon the same his opinion as to whether the
reason given is "a valid and sufficient reason" for the fail-
ure of the elector to vote. If no answer is received to the
officer's request for the same, that fact shall be noted on
the list of electors opposite the delinquent elector's name.
Within two months after such answer of the delinquent
elector should have been made, the officer to receive the
same shall send to the Commonwealth Electoral Officer a
certified declaration containing the names of the electors
who did not vote at the election, the names of those whom
or on whose behalf an answer was returned and the names
of those who failed to reply within the required time.
"Every elector who fails to vote at an election without a
valid and sufficient reason, or fails to make the proper
return for his failure to vote, or who shall state a false
reason in said return for not having voted, shall be deemed
to be guilty of an offence, the penalty for which shall be
a fine of two pounds". The proceedings for punishment
of such an offence shall not be instituted, except by the
Chief Electoral Officer or by an officer thereto authorized
in writing by said Chief Electoral Officer.
The machinery for enforcing this statute makes pro-
vision that when the aforesaid reply of the elector states
reasons for his failure to vote, which in the opinion of the
officer to receive the same is not a valid and sufficient
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reason, said officer shall, after endorsing his opinion there-
on, notify the elector thereof and inform him that he has
the option of having the matters dealt with by the Com-
monwealth Electoral Officer or by a court of summary
jurisdiction.
Any elector to whom said notification has been sent
who desires the matter to be dealt with by the Common-
wealth Electoral Officer and who is prepared to abide by
the decision of that officer, may deposit with the Returning
Officer such sum as that officer determines, to be appro-
priated in payment of the penalty, if any, which the Com-
monwealth Electoral Officer may impose upon him. Upon
the receipt, from an elector who has failed to vote, of a
notification consenting to the matter being dealt with by
the Commonwealth Electoral Officer and to abide by the
decision of that officer and of the deposit required, the
officer receiving the same shall transmit such notification,
together with the elector's reply, stating his reason for
having failed to vote and the Receiving Officer's opinion
thereon, to the said Commonwealth Electoral Officer. Said
Electoral Officer shall, upon the receipt from the Returning
Officer of the statements, consider all the facts, and if
satisfied that the elector concerned failed to vote at the
election without a valid and sufficient reason for that
failure, he may make an order imposing upon such elector
a penalty not exceeding two pounds, and notify the Return-
ing Officer thereof and of the time allowed for payment.
Any penalty so imposed by such Electoral Officer in pur-
suance with this regulation shall be a debt due to the Com-
monwealth and may be recovered accordingly.
The Chief Electoral Officer may review any order made
by a subordinate Electoral Officer in pursuance with these
regulations, and may, if he is of opinion that the circum-
stances justify such action, remit the penalty imposed by
the order otherwise; and if the Chief Electoral Officer im-
poses a penalty on such information being sent to the
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Returning Officer, he may deduct such amount as was so
imposed from such deposit as was made by the elector
for that purpose.
If the Divisional Returning Officer is satisfied that
there has been a violation of the Compulsory Voting Law
by an elector, who did not choose to submit the matter,
as aforesaid described, to the Chief Electoral Officer, he
shall forthwith cause proceedings to be taken against such
elector in a court of summary jurisdiction. In such pro-
ceedings, in said court, the said Returning Officer shall
send to the Court the elector's reply as to his reasons for
having failed to vote. Thereupon the Court shall, whether
the defendant is present or not, consider the contents of
the elector's reply as if it were given in evidence before
the Court-"If the defendant attends the court, and sets
up a defence differing in 'substance from the statement
contained in his reply, the Court shall, if it dismisses the
information, do so without awarding the defendant the
cost of his defence". In such proceedings, in a court of
summary jurisdiction, a notice shall be given to the alleged
delinquent elector that he may attend the court and answer
the charge in person, or may, at any time, not less than
seven days before the date fixed for the hearing, lodge with,
or send by post, to the prosecuting officer, a declaration
setting out any matter which he desires to set out in
answer to the charge; this declaration will be sent to the
Court for consideration of the matter set out therein as
if it were given in evidence before the Court, subject to
evidence in reply adduced by the prosecuting officer. It
shall be the duty of the prosecuting officer to inquire into
the truth of said declaration, and unless he withdraws the
prosecution, to bring the same and his findings to the
notice of the Court. The Court shall, at the hearing of
the case, consider the said declaration, whether the de-
fendant is present or not, as if the matter therein set out
were given in evidence before it, but if the defendant at-
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tends the court and sets up a defence differing in substance
from the statement contained in his declaration, the Court
shall, if it dismisses the prosecution, do so without award-
ing the defendant the cost of his defence. The prosecuting
officer shall be given proper time to make answer to the
defendant's declaration. When a declaration, as aforesaid,
has been lodged, as provided, with the Court, it shall pro-
ceed with the hearing and determination of the case,
whether the prosecuting officer is present or not, and shall
consider such declaration as if the matter set out therein
had been given in evidence before it, and shall, notwith-
standing the absence of the prosecuting officer, permit
testimony to be given for the prosecution by any witness
who is summoned by, or attends on behalf of, the prosecut-
ing officer.
THE LAW HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
The constitutionality of the law relating to compulsory
voting was tested and determined before the High Court of
Australia in the case of Judd v. McKeon; Judd being the
delinquent elector and McKeon the officer representing the
Commonwealth. In the majority opinion, it was set out
that "The appellant Judd was convicted of failing to vote
at an election of senators of New South Wales without a
valid and sufficient reason for such failure, contrary to
the provisions of law in such case made and provided"--
which law provides that "it shall be the duty of every
elector to record his vote at each election" and that "every
elector who fails to vote at an election without a valid and
sufficient reason for such failure shall be guilty of an
offence." On an appeal to Quarter Sessions, the conviction
was affirmed and this appeal is brought by special leave
from that decision.
The appellant contends that "the enactment of this
statute above quoted is beyond the powers of the Coin-
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monwealth Parliament, and that the reason he gave for
his failure to vote was a valid and sufficient reason".
In this opinion, it is held that the first contention can-
not be supported. The Constitution provides that the
"Parliament is empowered to make laws prescribing the
method of choosing senators subject to one condition only,
viz-that the method shall be uniform for all the States.
This power, subject only to the condition or qualification
named, is "plenary and unrestricted," and the only reason
advanced for denying to Parliament the right to prescribe
that every qualified elector shall record his vote was found-
ed-on the use of the word "choosing". It was said that
"the choosing of a candidate implied a desire on the part
of the elector that that candidate should be elected", and
that consequently the power of the Parliament was limited
to prescribing the method by which electors, desiring that
a candidate should be elected, should signify that desire
We do not think the meaning of the expression "choosing
senators" can be so restricted. In common parlance, "to
choose" means no more than to make a selection between
different things, or alternatives submitted, "to take by
preference out of all that are available". As an illustration
of the meaning of the corresponding noun "choice," the
Oxford Dictionary quotes the phrase, "I have given thee
thy choice of the manner in which thou wilt die", and this
use of the word seems to exclude the idea that a right
of choice can only be said to be given when one or the
other of the alternatives submitted is desired by the person
who is to exercise the right, or in other words to choose
between them. It remains to consider whether any of the
reasons given by the appellant was a valid and sufficient
reason. The reasons given were as follows, viz-"Without
prejudice to my legal rights, if any: All the political parties
and their candidates, participating in the election, support
and do all in their power to perpetuate capitalism with its
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exploitation of the working classes, war, unemployment,
prostitution etc".
"The Socialist Labor Party of which I am a member,
stands for the ending of capitalism and consequently its
members are prohibited from voting for the above men-
tioned supporters of capitalism, and that the Socialist Labor
Party has paid and lost hundreds of pounds in Federal
Election deposits for its candidates. * * * * The unjust
penalty of 25 pounds on each candidate penalizes us, if
we participate in a Federal Election, and your letter sug-
gests that we will be penalized if we don't. Is that fair?"
These reasons do not purport to express the views of the
appellant, but those of the party to which he belongs, and
in that view, his only excuse, which is clearly insufficient,
is that his party prohibits him from voting. But if the
reasons be taken as representing the individual view of the
appellant, they amount to no more than the expression of
an objection to the social order of the community in which
he lives.
In our opinion such an objection is not a valid and
sufficient reason for refusing to exercise his franchise.
One of the Justices is of the opinion that the question
as to the validity and sufficiency of an elector's reason for
not voting is a question of fact only and not a question of
law in our case. One of the Justices, who holds against
the majority, gives as his opinion that if the elector "has
no preference" that would constitute a valid and sufficient
reason for his being excused from voting. The majority
holding is that the appeal of Judd should be dismissed".
AS TO THE RESULT OF THE COMPULSORY
VOTING LAW
In a letter from Hon. J. D. Farrar, the Chief Electoral
Officer for the Commonwealth of Australia, he says as a
result of the law that "the compulsory voting law was pass,
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ed in 1924, since when the general elections (in 1925) and
a referendum (in 1926) have been held. The percentages
of voters to electors enrolled on those occasions were re-
spectively 91.31 and 91.07. The percentage of voters to
electors enrolled at the general elections next preceding
the introduction of compulsory voting was 57.95. The con-
stitutionality of the law was tested before the High Court
of Australia in the case of Judd v. McKeon and it was
held to be valid".
It has bee'n said that many people do not have sufficient
education to entitle them to vote, or that they have little
property and therefore they should not be allowed to vote.
If they do not have sufficient education who is to blame?
Should it not be the business of the Government to provide
for, and require that, all persons brought up in the State
should receive a sufficient amount of instruction and train-
ing to enable them to exercise this privilege. Besides, the
educated and well to do sometimes have less regard for the
welfare of the State than those of more limited education
and less wealth.
When high officials and members of the Judiciary of
our second largest city turn aside from their duty to do
honor to the memory of notorious gunmen and leaders of
gangs of outlaws, something is wrong, and we wonder if
crime and politics would not be divorced in Illinois, if that
state should adopt Compulsory Voting laws before our






Contracts-Terms on Invoices of Bailee Construed as Offer-Dliveeq
of further Goods by Bailor Acceptance
Liens-General Lien when Created by Contract
Constitutional Law-Act of May 23, 1907, P. L. 228 as Amended by
Act of May 20, 1913, P. L. 271, Attempting to Give General
Liens to Certain Classes-Special Law Creating Lien
Unconstitutional-Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania, Art. 111. Sec. 7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carson, a dyer, printed on his invoices and his bills the follow-
ing notice: "Notice-all goods received only on condition that they
are subject to a general lien, not only for the dyeing and finishing
thereof, but also for the balance of any former account due." Moss,
over a period of years, sent Carson yarns to be dyed. Finally Moss
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. At the time, Car-
son had in his possession yarns sent by Moss of the value of $5000
upon which $500 was due for the dyeing of the same. Moss was in-
debted to him in the sum of $4,500 upon other similar transactions.




I OPINION OF THE COURT
Rupp, J. It is a recognized rule of law that an assignee for the
benefit of creditors may bring suit in regard to the property assign-
ed, in his own name. It is also true that an assignee who takes with
notice oi equities in favor of third persons is bound thereby, and no
also, if he is chargeable with notice of equities existing against his
immediate assignor: 5 C. J. 974; Franklin Fire Insurance Company
v. West, 8 Watts & Sergeant 350; Seymour v. McKinstry, 106 N. Y.
230, 12 N. E. 348. It is not necessary to make any further attempt to
add anything to what was said in the opinions in those cases. Plain-
tiff therefore is entitled to all the rights in the goods that Moss had
at the time of his assignment.
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The defendant is possessed of goods which originally belonged to
Moss, to the value of $5000 upon which $500 is due for the dyeing of
the same. Plaintiff admits the defendant's lien as to this amount,
but the question to be answered by the court is whether defendant
can withhold the goods for the sum of $4,500 which is due him upon
other similar transactions with Moss.
The first question of law to be decided is whether a person en-
gaged in the business of dyeing silk or other goods is entitled to a
lien upon the silk of another that comes into his possession for the
purpose of being dyed, for the amount of the account due from the
owner of such silk by reason of the work and labor performed on
other silk of the same owner, such other silk being out of the pos-
session of the owner.
The first legislative attempt to create a general lien for this
particular industry was the Act of May 23, 1907, P. L. 228, entitled:
"An act concerning liens of manufacturers and throwsters of cotton,
woolen, and silk goods," the material parts of which statute, as
amended by the act of May 20, 1913, P. L. 271, read as follows:
"All persons or corporations engaged in the business of manu-
facturing, spinning, or throwing cotton, wool, or silk into yarn or
other goods, or engaged in the business of dyeing cotton, wool, or
silk yarns, shall be entitled to a lien upon the goods and property of
others that may come into their possession for the purpose of be-
ing manufactured, spun, or thrown into yarn or other goods, for the
amount of any account that may be due them, or any note or notes
taken on account of such account, from the owners of such cotton,
wool, or silk, by reason of any work and labor performed, and mat-
erials furnished, in or about the manufacturing, spinning, dyeing, or
throwing of the same or other goods of such owner or owners."
The second section of this statute provides that the goods may
be sold for the lien, under execution upon any judgment recovered.
The Act of May 23, 1907, was first construed by Judge McPher-
son of the United States Circuit Court in the case of L. H. Kem-
merer & Co., 205 Fed. 108, to exclude dyers. He said there, "A fami-
liar rule requires the act to be strictly construed; it changes a long-
established doctrine of the common law-that a bailee's lien for
work or materials can only be enforced against the particular goods
benefited thereby-and extends the scope of the lien so as to charge
the goods, not only for the benefits done to themselves, but also for
benefits done previously to other goods of the bailor, thus enlarging
a particular lien into a general lien. Moreover, an additional reason
for strict construction is found in the fact that the statute is special,
its purpose is to advantage only one class of bailees."
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Seven days after this decision, the legislature amended the Act
of 1907 to include dyers. There can be no doubt that this legis-
lation was intended to give to "manufacturers and throwsters, spin-
ners and dyers of cotton, wool, and silk goods" a general lien. It
is equally clear that it was not the intention by this legislation to
give the same right of lien and peculiar remedy for the collection of
debts to other manufacturers and tradesmen.
In the case of Gerli v. Perfect Silk Throwing Co., 70 Sup. 299,
the Superior Court declared the act of 1913 unconstitutional on the
grounds that the act gave "to a special limited class a right of lien
and a peculiar remedy for the collection of debts which it does not
give to other citizens and corporations." The act was declared to be
in conflict with Article II, Sec. 7, of the Constitution of Pennsy-
lvania, which forbids the general assembly to pass any local or
special law "authorizing the creation, expulsion or impairing of
liens; * * or providing or changing methods for the collection of
debts, or enforcing of judgments." See also Vulcanite Portland
Cement Company v. Allison, 220 Pa. 382; and Taylor Lumber Co.
v. Carnegie Institute, 225 Pa. 486.
The defendant contends that the decision of the Superior Court
is not conclusive authority and that the constitutionality of the act
has never been decided by the Supreme Court. While the Superior
Court is not the court of last resort in this Commonwealth, it is a
tribunal of such importance that the Federal Courts have followed
its decision construing this statute. See Berlet v. Lehigh Valley
Silk Mills, 287 Fed. 769; also Erie R. Co. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, 100.
In view of the foregoing decisions, the answer to the first ques-
tion must be founded on common law principles. Defendant rests
his lien on the ground of an implied contract arising out of the mode
of dealings between the parties. Plaintiff argues that a lien may be
created by an implied contract only under circumstances clearly in-
dicating an intention of the parties to create a lien on the specific
property, and that if words relating to a proposed lien express future
actions in regard to the creation of the lien, and the lien is also to
take effect by attaching in the future, no lien is created that could
attach to the property. There can be no doubt that a lien may arise
by implication from the general usage of trade or from the manner
of dealings between the parties. General liens, however, must be
established by inveterate usage, otherwise the courts will treat them
as encroachments on the common law.
In 2 Kent's Commentaries 637, the following proposition is laid
down: "A general lien for a balance of accounts is founded on cus-
tom, and is not favoured; and it requires strong evidence of a set-
tled and uniform usage, or of a particular mode of dealing between
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the parties, to establish it. The usages of any trade, sufficient to es-
tablish a general lien, must, however, have been so uniform and
notorious as to warrant the inference that the party against whom
the right is claimed had knowledge of it."
In Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & Sergeant 466, a distinction
was drawn between a commerical lien, which is the creature of usage,
and a common law lien, which is the creature of policy. The first
gives a right to retain for a balance of accounts; the second, for
services performed in relation to the particular property.
The transactions between Moss and the defendant covered a
period of years during which time there was ample opportunity for
them to establish some definite understanding as to the rights of
each party and fix a basis for future dealings between them. Under
these circumstances, the defendant might hold one lot of yarns until
he was paid for the work performed upon other lots which had been
delivered to Moss. It is obvious that their relations in the past were
satisfactory, and it is evident that there was no occasion for the de-
fendant to enforce his lien. Is it possible then, to infer from these
circumstances that the defendant by his conduct has waived his
rights ?
The principle is further considered in 2 Kent's Commentaries 637,
to the effect that "This general lien may also be created by express
agreement; as where one or more persons give notice that they will
not receive any property for the purposes of their trade or business,
except on condition that they shall have a lien upon it, not only in
respect to the charges arising on the particular goods, but for the
general balance of this account. All persons who afterwards deal
with them, with the knowledge of such notice, will be deemed to have
acceded to that agreement."
In Overton on Liens, page 52, section 45, cited in Firth v. Hamill,
167 Pa. 382, it is said, "A general lien, therefore, must be shown to
have its existence through a proven custom of the trade, or it
may be shown by a notice of such claim brought home to the bailor
prior to his making a deposit of goods; any further bailment will
be presumed to be made by assent on the part of the bailor. This
applies to all cases where the bailee is not compellable by law to re-
ceive the bailment."
This brings us to the second question as to whether the notice
printed in the invoice must be considered in determing what the con-
tract was, and that said words constituted an express condition that
became a part of the contract between the parties.
The facts show that the notice of this general condition was
printed on invoices mailed to Moss. Plaintiff contends that the terms
as printed on the invoices were brought to the acceptor's notice after
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the contract was completed, and therefore there was no acceptance
of such terms.
A great many contracts are now made by delivery, by one of the
contracting parties to the others, of a document in a common form,
stating the terms by which the person delivering it will enter the
proposed contract. Such a form constitutes the offer of the party
tendering it. If the form is accepted without objection by the person
to whom it is tendered, this person is, as a general rule, bound by its
contents; and his act amounts to an acceptance of the offer made to
him, whether he reads the document or otherwise informs himself of
its contents or not: Golden v. Pittsburgh R. Co. 28 Sup. 313.
In the present case, the invoices were in use during the whole
course of dealing-with Moss, covering a period of years. In the ab-
sence of any denial that the notice or condition was received and
read by Moss or his employees, the presumption is that it was re-
ceived and read. No evidence was offered by the plaintiff to rebut
this presumption. The transactions between the parties were many
and frequent, and no effort was made by the plaintiff to show that
Moss or his employees did not receive and read the notice, or that
they were not aware of the condition upon which the defendant re-
ceived the goods, and the conclusion is irresistible that they sent the
goods in question with knowledge of the condition upon which alone
they would be received; and under this state of facts the contract
has the same force and effect as if it had been formally signed by the
parties.
By his conduct, Moss precluded any defence as to absence of
notice and showed acquiescence in the stipulation. His silence and
his willingness to continue his relations with defendant may be taken
as an acceptance of the terms.
Where parties make particular agreements and stipulations be-
tween themselves, such agreements and stipulations take the place
of general principles of law. The parties make the law in such cas-
es for themselves: Gray v. Wilson, 9 Watts 512; Firth v. Hamill,
167 Pa. 382.
judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only basis to support the claim for a general lien, in the in-
stant case, is on that of a contract. That the terms of a contract
may be shown by acts and circumstances as well as by words, writ-
ten or oral, is axiomatic. Is such a contract shown here? It is a
question of fact whether Moss knew of the conditions, in Carson's
offer to dye goods, that all such goods were subject to a general lien.
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Although it is not expressly shown that Moss knew of these con-
ditions, yet there is ample evidence on which to support the finding
of the court below (acting as jury) that Moss knew of these con-
ditions when he delivered goods. Such being the case, by delivery
he accepted the offer of Carson and is bound thereby. He con-
tracted to give a general lien to Carson and his assignee is bound,
thereby.
The case is identical with Firth v. Hamill, 167 Pa. 382. See
Hecht v. Dye Works, 66 Super. 97 to the same effect. The judg-
ment of the learned court below is affirmed.
VANCE v. YARNALL
Agency-Agent Appropriates Funds to Personal Use by Checks on
Bank against Account of Principal--Bank not Liable unless
Actual Knowledge or Bad Faith
Uniform Fiduciaries Act May 31, 1923, P. L. 468, Sec. 9.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vance, agent for Yarnell, was authorized to draw checks on the
account of his principal in the Merchant Bank. He drew checks
in this manner to the extent of $10,000 and deposited them in his
personal account in the same bank. He later spent this money
in stock speculation. Yarnell now sues this bank for the $10,000.
Weiss, for plaintiff.
Weaver, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Keller, J. As a general rule, every person who undertakes to
deal with an alleged agent is, by the mere fact of the agency, put
upon inquiry, and must discover at his peril that it is in its nature
and extent sufficient to permit the agent to do the proposed act,
and that its source can be traced to the will of the alleged principal:
2 C. J. 562. This rule was recognized in Pennsylvania starting with
the case of Smith v. Ebert, 11 Kulp 63. In that case, the court said,
"the rule is as to third parties in their dealing with an agent, that
they must be upon their guard, and if they deal with him they do
so at their own risk." The rule is further asserted in Dodge v. Wil-
liams, 47 Superior 302; Lauer Brewing Co. v. Schmidt, 24 Superior
396; Interstate Securities Co. v. Third National Bank, 231 Pa. 422.
But this well known, general rule has been partly changed in Pennsy-
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lvania. The legislature in 1923 passed an Act entitled Uniform Fid-
uciaries Act (May 31, 1923, P. L. 468, Sec. 9) and the wording of the
Statute describes just such a situation as we have in this case. The
act reads, "If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank to his personal
credit of checks drawn by him upon an account in the name of his
principal, if he is empowered to draw checks thereon; * * the bank
receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary
is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary, and
the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any
part thereof, upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being
liable to the principal, unless the bank receives the deposit or pays
the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a
breach of his obligation as fiduciary in making such deposit, or in
drawing such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action
in receiving the deposit or paying the check amounts to bad faith."
Before the passage of this act, it cannot be questioned that the
bank would have beeh liable to the principal, being governed by the
general rule as laid down in the cases cited supra. But from our
interpretation of the statute, we are of the opinion that the rule has
been changed. The statute outlines a set of facts perfectly analag-
ous to this case and says the bank shall not be put on inquiry unless
it had actual knowledge or knowledge of such facts that will consti-
tute bad faith.
Counsel for plaintiff cite the act, but contend the bank should
have had actual knowledge; citing as authority cases decided before
the passage of the act. The court thinks these cases are no longer
an authority upon this subject. It must have been the intention of
the legislature on passing this act to change the existing law or it
would never have spoken at all upon the subject. The statute very
plainly says "the bank shall not be put on inquiry" then qualifies by
saying, "unless they had actual knowledge," et cetera. The legisla-
ture must have intended "actual knowledge" to constitute more
knowledge than is shown from the set of facts. We reiterate that
the facts in this case and the wording of the statute are exact in
every detail, and the act says that the bank is not put on inquiry.
The legislature must have intended actual knowledge to be more
than was shown in this case or they would never have added such a
qualifying clause. To read the act in any other light would be fal-
lacious. It would be the same as saying, "a bank shall not be put on
inquiry when an agent, having authority to draw checks on his prin-
cipal, deposits such checks to his personal account, but if an agent
does such an act, such actions shall constitute actual knowledge on
part of the bank and they must be on inquiry." In other words, un-
less we hold that the knowledge must be more than as shown in
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this case, the latter part of the act neutralizes the former part.
In any case similar to this it would be a question of fact whether
the bank had knowledge enough to hold them liable. But from the
meagre set of facts as given in this case, we hold as a matter of law
that the bank is not liable.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
We can not agree with the learned court below that the adop-
tion of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act of May 31, 1923, P. L. 468 has
changed the law of Pennsylvania on the issue presented in the in-
stant case. It must be remembered that many portions of Uniform
Acts do not change the existing law but merely reaffirm it. Such is
the case here. See Safe Deposit Bank v. Diamond National Bank,
194 Pa. 335. It was there held, in a per curiam decision, that where
checks drawn to the order of an administrator *are deposited by him
in his personal account and he checks out the funds for private pur-
poses, the bank is not liable.
The Uniform Act adopts the same rule of non-liability unless
there are additional facts present which constitute actual knowledge
or bad faith on the part of the bank. The facts in the instant case
are not meagre but constitute the relevant facts in many actual cases.
We agree, however, with his determination and his construction of
the statute. The federal rule is the same: Trust Co. v. Cahav, 47
Sup. Ct. 661 (1927).
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
